In recent years, Dharmakīrti’s Sahopalambhaniyama has become a focus in the research on Buddhist epistemology. However, despite several scholarly investigations on this topic, its proper significance has remained in darkness. The goal of this paper is to clarify the true nature of Dharmakīrti’s sahopalambhaniyama. This involves two major tasks. First, to argue that Dharmakīrti’s sahopalambhaniyama is not a “logical” argument. In this context, it will start with a critique of the interpretations of Shiro Matsumoto, Takashi Iwata, Birgit Kellner, and John Taber. Secondly, to develop a phenomenological reading of Dharmakīrti’s sahopalambhaniyama. Specifically, Dharmakīrti’s sahopalambhaniyama will be compared to Sartre’s axiom in phenomenology. All this will show that it is incorrect to understand Dharmakīrti’s sahopalambhaniyama as a so-called “Proof for Idealism” (Franco). As a consequence, it will also confirm my general thesis that both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are neither Sautrantikas nor Yogācāra idealists. Rather, their Buddhist epistemology is basically an "epistemology without ontology."

Authors:
Wing-cheuk Chan, Brock University, Canada & Academia Sinica, Taiwan

About the Presenter(s)
Professor Wing-cheuk Chan is a University Professor/Principal Lecturer at Brock University, Canada; Academia Sinica, Taiwan. in Taiwan

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